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Abstract  
This paper reconsiders the income-splitting rules of the Nordic dual income tax 
system, introduced to address the incentives to shift income between labor and 
capital income tax bases. These rules impute a return on equity, categorized as 
capital income, and tax the residual roughly at the rates levied on labor income. 
There are broadly two ways to calculate the capital income part. One is to impute 
a return on the acquisition price of shares (Sweden and Norway) and the second 
is to calculate a return on the net book assets of the firm (Finland). This paper 
addresses the economic effects of the net asset-based splitting method, which has 
not been studied thoroughly in earlier literature. Using a dynamic investment 
model, we show that at appropriately chosen parameter values the net assets-
based split exhibits the key properties of the reportedly neutral ACE corporation 
tax. Our analysis, therefore, implies that the incentive problems of Finnish 
taxation of closely held companies, found in some earlier studies, derive from 
wrong parameter values rather than from wrong principles. 
 
Key words: dual income tax, income-splitting, neutral taxation, investment, 
depreciation allowances 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the Nordic dual income tax (DIT) has been discussed as a 
blueprint for tax reform in several countries in Europe and beyond.1 The 
distinctive feature of DIT is that it systematically separates the tax treatment of 
capital income from the taxation of other types of income. A flat rate is levied on 
capital income from all sources, while other income forms are subject to a 
conventional progressive tax schedule.  
It is widely recognized that one central issue in implementing a DIT is how to 
treat the business income of entrepreneurs who both work in their businesses and 
have invested their wealth therein.2  The nature of the problem is slightly 
different depending on the organizational form. In the case of closely held 
companies (CHC), the question is how to prevent owner-managers from 
misreporting their remuneration as leniently taxed capital income. The solution to 
this income-shifting problem adopted by the Nordic countries was to split the 
income of entrepreneurs into capital income and labor income components. This 
was implemented by first calculating an imputed return on the equity invested in 
the firm (normal return), categorizing this as capital income, and taxing the rest 
of the remuneration (excess return) as labor income at progressive rates.  
The current rules for splitting income received from CHCs basically comprise 
two different approaches. In Sweden the normal return part of an owner’s income 
is calculated as a return on the initial purchase price of the firm’s shares. Norway 
subsequently adopted this rule to calculate the rate-of-return allowance (RRA), 
the key element of its much-discussed shareholder model (see Sørensen, 2005).  
The second approach is the one chosen by Finland, where the normal return part 
is calculated as an imputed return on the net assets recorded in the firm’s 
financial accounts.  
However, while designed to address income-shifting, the splitting systems may 
have some unintended side effects too. In particular they may distort the 
investment and financing decisions. So the key economic question is how the 
alternative designs fare in this respect. These aspects of the Nordic systems have 
been subject to considerable attention in economic research. For example, the 
studies by Lindhe et al. (2004) and Sørensen (2005) argue that the (Swedish and 
                                              
1 DIT was first implemented by the three Nordic countries Sweden, Norway and Finland. Variants of DIT 
have been proposed by Sinn (2003) and Spengel and Wiegard (2004) for Germany, by Keuschnigg and 
Dietz (2007) for Switzerland, Sørensen (2009) for New Zealand, Sørensen and Johnson (2010) for 
Australia, and Kleinbard (2010) for the USA. Meanwhile, dualistic aspects have become increasingly 
common, particularly in Europe in the form of low final withholding taxes on certain types of capital 
income.  
2 See for example Sørensen (1994) and Boadway (2004). 
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Norwegian) purchase price approach is theoretically consistent, and yields 
neutral taxation along several margins if designed appropriately.      
In particular, the literature on the effects of the Norwegian shareholder model 
argues that if the RRA allowance is calculated using an appropriately chosen 
imputed rate of return, the present value of future allowances will correspond to 
the initial investment (Sørensen, 2005). This implies that, in the form of the ACE 
tax (the Allowance for Corporate Equity), the shareholder model is a present 
value equivalent to a cash-flow tax, and therefore the tax system is neutral with 
respect to investment and financing decisions. The literature also argues that the 
RRA allowance makes the tax system neutral with respect to the timing of 
dividend distributions and realizations of capital gains, and therefore removes the 
lock-in effect, a problem of standard gains taxes. (Sørensen, 2005; Lindhe and 
Södersten, 2012) 
In contrast, Lindhe, Södersten and Öberg (2002, 2004), Hietala and Kari (2006) 
and Kari and Karikallio (2007) argue that the Finnish tax rules for the owners of 
CHCs distort the investment and financing decisions of firms. They claim that 
the cost of capital varies between firms depending on the marginal tax rate on the 
labor income of the principal owners and may in extreme cases even be negative.  
These studies seem to have led to a prevailing understanding that the RRA model 
is the ideal way to calculate the normal return part of shareholder income, and 
that it is clearly better than the net asset method practiced in Finland. However, 
the academic literature has paid little attention to whether this approach could be 
designed to yield neutrality. In 2010, a committee in Finland argued that this 
could be implemented through some rather small modifications to the tax rules 
(Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
To reconsider the issue, we set up a dynamic investment model to analyze the 
incentive effects of a stylized version of the Finnish net asset-based splitting 
system. We closely follow the approach by Boadway and Bruce (1984) and show 
that under rather mild assumptions concerning the tax parameters the model 
satisfies many of the neutrality properties of the so-called generalized cash flow 
tax (GCFT). There is an even more direct link to the ACE tax, a special case of 
GCFT. (IFS, 1991) Unlike the RRA but with the ACE tax, the net asset-based 
imputed income method does not require an alignment of fiscal depreciation with 
economic depreciation. Similarly, the system seems to improve investment 
neutrality for all sources of financing, which is also a property of the ACE tax. 
We conclude that the failures of the past and current Finnish system are not in its 
principles but rather in an inappropriate choice of parameter values (such as that 
of the imputed rate-of-return). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background of the tax systems we analyze. Section 3 presents the analysis of the 
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incentive properties of the net assets-based imputed income method. Section 4 
concludes. 
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2. Institutional backdrop – Income-splitting under 
Nordic dual income tax 
The distinctive feature of the Nordic dual income tax is that it divides personal 
income into capital income and labor income shares and taxes these two tax 
bases using different tax schedules. While net capital income is subject to a 
proportional tax rate, labor income is taxed using a conventional progressive tax 
schedule.  
In its most streamlined version, defined in Sørensen (1994), the DIT aligns the 
flat personal tax rate on capital income with the corporate income tax rate and 
also with the marginal tax rate of the lowest labor income tax bracket. In order to 
achieve neutrality in capital income taxation, tax bases should be as broad as 
possible and the double taxation of corporate-source income should be fully 
alleviated. In this design DIT can be seen as a flat tax on all net income plus a 
surtax on high labor income.3  
The Nordic applications followed many aspects of the prototype model, Norway 
being perhaps the closest and Finland coming next. Norway, for example, took 
the broadening of the tax base for capital income furthest and eliminated double 
taxation of both distributed and retained corporate profits.4   
Over the years the income tax systems of these countries have been subject to 
several adjustments (in both tax rates and tax bases), but the essential aspects of 
DIT have remained. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the Nordic income 
tax systems in force in 2012. 
  
                                              
3 In fact, Norway’s income tax is designed in this way. See for example NOU (2014).  
4 Norway included an imputed return on owner-occupied housing into taxable income subject to the 
proportional rate and adopted a full imputation system for the taxation of dividends and a corresponding 
system to achieve “single” taxation of capital gains (Sørensen, 2007).    
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Table 1.  Main aspects of the dual income tax systems of Norway, Sweden 
and Finland in 2012 
  Norway  Sweden  Finland 
Year of introduction 
of DIT 
1992  1991  1993 
Personal tax rate on 
capital income, 2012 
28  30  28 
Personal MTR on 
earned income, 2012   
28‐47,8  31,5‐56,6  27‐55,5 
Corporate tax rate, 
2012 
28  28  26 
Tax base of capital 
income  
net income from nearly all 
sources 
net income from nearly all 
sources 
net income from nearly all 
sources 
Taxation of interest 
income 
as capital income  as capital income  final withholding tax, 28 % 
Integration of 
corporation and 
personal income tax, 
main rule 
Dividends and capital gains 
in excess of an imputed 
return are taxable capital 
income 
Classical system, dividends are 
included in taxable capital 
income 
70 % of dividends are 
taxable capital income 
Main source: OECD Tax data base 2012, http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm   
 
We observe that the key aspects of the tax systems still follow the principles 
underlying dual income taxation.  However, Sweden and Finland have diverted 
from the original principle that personal capital income and corporate profits are 
taxed at the same rate. Similarly, Norway and Finland have diverged with their 
full imputation systems.  
It was clear from the beginning that DIT requires some mechanism to distinguish 
labor income from capital income when these two income forms are mixed 
together as business income (labor-capital income centrifuge in Kleinbard, 2010). 
The problem is common but differs slightly between sole proprietors and 
entrepreneurs that operate their businesses in a company form.  
If all the business income of a sole proprietor (or an active partner of a 
partnership) were taxed as labor income at the progressive schedule with high 
marginal tax rates, the compensation that she receives for investing her wealth in 
the firm, would be over-taxed compared to other types of capital income. The 
Nordic countries solved this problem by first calculating an imputed return on 
business assets and categorizing this as capital income and considering the 
residual as labor income. The capital income part was calculated by multiplying 
the gross (Norway) or net (Sweden and Finland) business assets of the firm by an 
assumed rate of return. Hagen and Sørensen (1998) and Sørensen (2007) discuss 
the alternative approaches and the methods applied in practice in the three Nordic 
countries. 
If there weren’t any analogous rules for the income of an owner/manager of a 
CHC her salary paid by the company would constitute labor income whereas 
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dividends received and realized capital gains would constitute capital income for 
taxation purposes. Due to the wide gap between the marginal tax rates on labor 
and capital income, owners would face strong incentives to withdraw most of 
their income in the form of leniently taxed capital income (dividends and capital 
gains).  
Therefore, some rules for splitting of income from CHCs are needed. The design 
of the method is not as obvious as in the case of sole proprietors.  This has been 
reflected in the differences between the solutions adopted by the three Nordic 
countries and also in the frequent changes made to the rules over the years. As an 
example, Norway treated income from CHCs broadly similarly as a sole 
proprietor’s income. The profit was divided into capital and labor income parts, 
and these parts were directly taxed as the income of the owner/manager (for more 
detail, see Hagen and Sørensen, 1998). However, in 2006 Norway abandoned 
this full integration scheme and moved to more traditional taxation of company-
source income where the remuneration paid by the company is subject to taxation 
at the owner level (salaries and dividends).  
Table 2 summarizes the central aspects of the current practices in the tax 
treatment of income from CHCs.      
Table 2.  Splitting of income from closely held companies under DIT in 2012  
  Norway  Sweden  Finland 
Is the split targeted at 
small companies? 
No, dividends from all 
companies subject to splitting 
Yes, at the dividend income 
of active owners of CHCs 
Yes, at dividends of owners 
of non‐listed companies 
What is split  Dividends and capital gains  Dividends  Dividends 
Imputed rate of return   After‐tax interest on 3‐month 
gov. bonds; 2012: 1,1% 
Gov. bond rate plus 6%; 
2012: 10.65% 
Fixed, 8% 
Capital base  Adj. purchase price of shares  Adj. purchase price of 
shares  
Net assets of the CHC 
Other elements  ‐  The imputed capital income 
includes a “wage 
addendum” (1) 
‐ 
Tax treatment of the 
imputed return    
Tax exempt  Taxed as capital income at 
reduced rate of 20% 
Exempt up to 60,000 euros; 
70% of any return beyond 
taxable capital income   
Tax treatment of 
excess return 
Capital income (28%)   Full inclusion as labor 
income (progressive 
schedule)  
70% included in taxable 
labor income (progressive 
schedule) 
Carry‐forward rules  Yes  Yes  No 
Sources: Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2012), Sørensen (2007), OECD Tax Data Base  
(1) See Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2012) Box 3.1 for the details of the Swedish system.   
In 2006, after the repeal of its original method for taxing active owners of CHCs, 
Norway introduced its current system, where an imputed normal return is 
separated from the sum of dividends and realized capital gains (shareholder 
income) and is treated as being tax-exempt in personal taxation (rate-of-return 
allowance, RRA). Any amount exceeding the RRA is taxed as capital income at a 
rate 28 %. 
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The Norwegian shareholder tax is not targeted at CHCs only but applies to all 
dividends and realized gains received by individual shareholders. The RRA 
allowance is calculated as an imputed rate of return times the purchase price of 
the shares stepped up by any unutilized RRA-allowances. This step-up procedure 
effectively implies that unused allowances can be carried forward with interest. 
The main reason for this step-up mechanism is so that only capital gains in 
excess of normal returns are subject to tax. In Norway the imputed rate of return 
is set at the three-month government bond rate after tax. Hence the rate does not 
include any risk premium.  
In Sweden the splitting rules are targeted at owners of CHCs working in the firm 
(‘active owners’). Imputed capital income is calculated broadly as in Norway, by 
factoring the adjusted purchase price of shares by the imputed rate of return. The 
adjustments include stepping-up by unutilized allowances, as in Norway. This 
imputed part of dividend income is taxed as capital income but at a concessional 
rate of 20%. Any amount in excess of this imputed income is fully included in 
taxable labor income.5     
While the goals of the Finnish splitting system for closely held companies are 
broadly the same as in Norway and Sweden, there are two important differences. 
First, the rules apply to all shareholders of non-listed companies. Hence the 
coverage of the rules is much broader than in Sweden but somewhat narrower 
than in Norway where the RRA allowance is part of the general dividend tax 
system. A second important difference is that while imputed capital income is 
calculated similarly by factoring the capital base by an imputed rate of return, the 
capital base is the firm’s net assets (gross assets minus debt). In 2012, the 
imputed return was tax exempt up to 60,000 euros and partly taxable (70 %) as 
capital income on any excess amount. 70% of any dividends in excess of the 
imputed return was added to labor income. As in Sweden, the imputed rate of 
return includes a risk premium reflecting the dominant views at the time the 
systems were designed. In 2012 the rate was set at 8%.   
Observe the different practices in the tax treatment of excess dividend. While 
Sweden and Finland include such dividends in the recipient’s taxable labor 
income, subject to a progressive tax schedule with high top marginal tax rates, 
Norway taxes them as capital income at the standard proportional tax rate. To 
avoid incentives to shift profits between the two tax bases, Norway aims to 
maintain the combined effective rate on excess dividends broadly at the level of 
the top marginal rates on labor income. Hence, the tax rates should satisfy the 
following equality: 
(1)  τ୤ ൅ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻτୢ ൌ τ୵, 
                                              
5 On top of the capital return is also included a very specific element, a share of wages paid by the firm 
(see e.g. Alstadsaeter and Jacob 2012). 
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where  τ୤ denotes the corporate tax rate, τୢ the tax rate on excess dividend and τ୵ the top marginal tax rate on labor income. Norway taxed in 2012 the excess 
dividends as capital income at the standard rate τ୮. Hence, in Norway, τ୤ ൌ τ୮ 
and τ୵ were chosen in such a way that condition (1) was satisfied when τୢ ൌ τ୮. 
We address the relative merits of the alternative approaches to tax excess 
dividends in section 3.3.  
While we can observe a series of interesting differences between the splitting 
systems of the three Nordic countries, from the point of view of this paper the 
principal difference is in how they calculate the imputed normal return part of 
dividends.  Finland has chosen the net assets in the company’s balance sheet as 
the capital base, while Norway and Sweden calculate the imputed return based on 
the adjusted purchase price of the shares. In the Nordic debate the latter approach 
has been seen as the standard, a theoretically consistent method, and the Finnish 
one inferior and theoretically obscure. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate 
whether this view is too black and white. 
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3.  Net assets-based splitting system in a dynamic 
model 
This section is composed as follows. First, in section 3.1 we consider a relatively 
simple case and show how the neutrality properties are achieved in this case. 
Second, in section 3.2 we show the neutrality properties in the most general case 
and provide a discussion of the results. Section 3.3 shows the neutrality 
properties in some interesting special cases. 
3.1 Simple case (ૌ܌ ൌ ૌܘ ൌ ૌ܎) 
In this section we consider a model where a closely held company (CHC) 
maximizes the present value of the revenue flow to its shareholders net of taxes 
and new equity, and takes into account both firm-level taxation and individual-
level taxation. 
The firm produces using capital as the only input and finances from retained 
profits and new equity Q. Its operating profit is denoted by πሺKሻ and it spends the 
accruing resources on dividends D, investment	I and corporate taxes T୤. The 
firm’s budget constraint is 
(2)  πሺKሻ ൅ Q ൌ D ൅ I ൅ T୤ 
 
The profit function is strictly concave (πᇱሺKሻ ൐ 0 and πᇱᇱሺKሻ ൏ 0). Debt 
financing is ruled out and all prices are normalized to one in our calculations.6 D 
and Q are both chosen to be non-negative. The lower boundary for Q	implies that 
the CHC cannot distribute profits through repurchases of shares. This constraint 
is not grounded in current regulations, rather it is an assumption chosen to 
simplify the analysis. However, the actual practice among Nordic CHC’s 
supports it. Such firms rarely buy back shares. They usually have a small stock of 
initial equity, collected at the time the firm was set up, and a larger stock of 
accumulated profits.   
The firm’s capital stock depreciates at an exponential rate δ. Therefore, the 
equation of motion for capital reads as follows: 
(3)  Kሶ ൌ I െ δK 
 
                                              
6 Debt financing might provide additional interesting insights, but in this paper our focus is on the effects 
of income- splitting on investment incentives, not on the choice between debt and equity. 
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The accounting stock of capital, A, depreciates at an exponential rate α (fiscal 
depreciation) which may differ from δ. The equation of motion for A is thus: 
(4)   Aሶ ൌ I െ αA 
 
Corporate taxes are paid on profits after fiscal depreciation. By denoting the 
corporate tax rate by τ୤ the corporate tax reads as follows: 
 
(5)  T୤ ൌ τ୤ሾπሺKሻ െ αAሿ. 
 
Thus, with given profits (πሺKሻ) corporate tax is the lower the higher the fiscal 
depreciation rate (α) and the higher the accounting stock (A). 
To model the owner-level taxation in a simple form, let us assume that tax is paid 
on dividends at the rate τୢ and all other forms of capital income at the 
proportional effective rate τ୮.7 The tax rates generally satisfy τୢ ൒ τ୮ ൒ τ୤. In 
our model there is another difference between the tax treatment of dividends and 
other types of capital income. An equity allowance, iE, is deducted from dividend 
income. Here i is called the imputed rate of return (or normal rate of return) and 
E	is the value of the firm’s equity capital. Thus the tax on dividends reads as 
follows: 
(6)  Tୈ ൌ τୢሺD െ iEሻ. 
 
Dividend income net of taxes is hence: 
 
(7)  D୒ୣ୲ ൌ D െ Tୈ ൌ ሺ1 െ τୢሻD ൅ τୢiE. 
 
In the remainder of this subsection we assume the tax rates to be equal, τୢ ൌτ୮ ൌ τ୤ (simple case).  
The firm maximizes the value of the revenue flow from the firm to the 
shareholders net of taxes and new equity issues: 
(8)  max	V଴ ൌ ׬ ሺγD୒ୣ୲ െ Qሻeି஡୲dtஶ଴ . 
                                              
7 This means that the effective tax rate on capital gains is the same as the standard rate on capital income. 
Even if many related studies have chosen the effective tax rate on capital gains to be lower, we choose 
these to be the same since this choice provides simpler calculations and is still capable of illustrating our 
main conclusion.  
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Here γ ൌ ଵଵିத౦ and ρ is the discount factor. 
The term γD୒ୣ୲ െ Q in the objective function is equivalent to the following 
expression:8 
(9)  γD୒ୣ୲ െ Q ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ െ I ൅ τ୤αA ൅ த౦ଵିத౦ iE. 
 
In the net asset-based splitting system the normal return on equity is calculated as 
a return on the firm’s net book assets (total assets minus debt). As we are 
considering an equity-financed firm we may align the value of the firm’s equity 
capital (E) with the firm’s accounting stock of capital A, i.e. E ൌ A. Thus we 
have 
(10)  γD୒ୣ୲ െ Q ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ െ I ൅ τ୤αA ൅ த౦ଵିத౦ iA. 
 
This is equivalent to: 
 
(11)  γD୒ୣ୲ െ Q ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿ െ τ୤ሾAሶ െ த౦த౜൫ଵିத౦൯ iAሿ. 
 
And our objective function (eq. (8)) reads as 
 
(12) max	V଴ ൌ ׬ ሺγD୒ୣ୲ െ Qሻeି஡୲dtஶ଴ ൌ 	 ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ׬ ሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿeି஡୲dt െ
ஶ
଴
τ୤ ׬ ሾஶ଴ Aሶ െ
த౦
த౜ሺଵିத౦ሻ iAሿe
ି஡୲dt. 
 
With a suitable choice of the imputed rate of return, i, the latter integral becomes 
a constant and the optimization problem reduces to that which would obtain in 
the absence of taxation. By choosing i ൌ த౜ሺଵିத౦ሻத౦ ρ this is the case. The latter term 
can then be written as follows:9 τ୤A଴, which is a constant. 
Therefore, with the choice 
(13)   i ൌ த౜ሺଵିத౦ሻத౦ ρ 
 
                                              
8 See equations (A1) and (A2) in the Appendix. 
9 See equation (A4) in the Appendix. 
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the original maximization problem becomes equivalent to the following: 
 
(14)  max Vଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ׬ ሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿeି஡୲dtஶ଴  
 
Since the tax term ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ is factored out, the problem is equal to the original 
problem in the absence of any taxes,  T୤ ൌ 0, Tୈ ൌ 0, and has the following 
solution:10 
(15)  πᇱሺKሻ ൌ ρ ൅ δ. 
 
Hence, under certain conditions concerning tax rates and the imputed rate of 
return, the net asset-based splitting system becomes neutral with respect to the 
firm’s investment decisions. In this simple model the system is in fact equivalent 
to the ACE tax. Therefore it also exhibits the ACE’s well-known property that 
fiscal depreciation rates have no effect on investment (Boadway and Bruce 1984 
and Devereux and Freeman 1991). We will develop and interpret the results in 
the following sections. 
3.2 General case (ૌ܌ ൒ ૌܘ ൒ ૌ܎) 
Above we employed a methodology similar to Boadway and Bruce (1984). Even 
if this allows us to derive the optimal conditions in a convenient way, it still has 
its own restrictions. In what follows we generalize the above result, derive an 
additional result regarding the effects of fiscal depreciation allowances and 
provide the intuition and reasoning behind the results. For this we need to 
augment the model and employ dynamic optimization. 
Compared to the above we now relax the assumption regarding the similarity of 
the tax rates and study the properties of the splitting system in a more general 
framework, where the corporate tax rate τ୤, the tax rate on capital income τ୮ and 
the tax rate on excess dividends τୢ  are allowed to differ in the following way: τୢ ൒ τ୮ ൒ τ୤ . Furthermore, with the case τ୤ ൏ τ୮ in mind, we add a new 
element. A share s of the normal return on equity is included in the owner’s 
taxable income taxed at rate τ୮. Dividend income net of taxes becomes: 
(16) D୒ୣ୲ ൌ D െ ሾτ୮siA ൅ ߬ௗሺD െ iAሻሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻܦ ൅ ሺ߬ௗ െ τ୮sሻiA. 
 
                                              
10 See equation (A5) in the Appendix. 
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Including the share s of normal dividend in taxable capital income can be 
justified as follows. It is compensation for the low corporate tax rate. Without it 
the normal return of dividend would be taxed at a lower rate than the owner’s 
direct investment in interest-bearing alternative assets. To make the system 
neutral with this respect the difference in effective tax rates should be removed 
(henceforth the second neutrality). This happens when:  
(17) ߬௙ ൅ ൫1 െ ߬௙൯ݏ߬௣ ൌ ߬௣ 		⟺ 		ݏ ൌ ఛ೛ିఛ೑൫ଵିఛ೑൯ఛ೛  .  
 
Observe that 	ݏ ൌ 0 when ߬௣ ൌ ߬௙ and ݏ ൐ 0  when ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙.	 
 
The marginal condition corresponding to equation (15) for the augmented model 
can be written as follows (see Appendix): 
 
(18) FᇱሺKሻ ൌ πᇱሺKሻ െ δ ൌ ஡ଵିத౜ ቂ1 െ τ୤
஑ିஔ
஡ା஑ቃ െ
த೏ି௦த౦
ሺଵିத౜ሻሺଵିத೏ሻ ݅ ቂ1 െ
஑ିஔ
஡ା஑ቃ 
 
where FᇱሺKሻ is the marginal rate of return after true economic depreciation. The 
interpretation of the condition goes as follows. The first of the two terms on the 
right-hand side stands for the effective cost of equity financing, where ஡ଵିத౜ is the 
unit cost of equity, and the bracketed term is the share of marginal investment 
that is financed with equity. The term  τ୤ ஑ିஔ஡ା஑  reflects the deferral of corporate 
taxes due to accelerated depreciation and is interpreted as the (average) share of 
investment financed by deferred taxes. So, we may consider that part of the 
investment is financed with equity and the rest from deferred taxes. The latter 
element has a zero unit cost, and therefore does not show up.11  
The second term on the right-hand side is the effect of personal level equity 
allowance on the cost of capital.  Observe that accelerated depreciation α ൐ δ 
decreases this effect (- ஑ିஔ஡ା஑ ൏ 0ሻ . The intuition is that with accelerated 
depreciation the average book value of equity is lower, and the allowance 
smaller, than with fiscal deprecation that corresponds to economic depreciation, 
α ൌ δ.  
 
In order to get another angle on our interpretations, let us rewrite equation (18) in 
the following way: 
 
(19)  FᇱሺKሻ ൌ ஡ଵିத౜ െ
த೏ି௦த౦
ሺଵିத౜ሻሺଵିத೏ሻ ݅ ൅ ቂ
஑ିஔ
஡ା஑
த೏ି௦த౦
ሺଵିத౜ሻሺଵିதౚሻ ݅ െ
஑ିஔ
஡ା஑
஡த౜
ଵିத౜ቃ. 
 
                                              
11 See e.g. Södersten (1982) and Kanniainen and Södersten (1995). 
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The bracketed term on the right-hand side collects the two routes through which 
accelerated fiscal depreciation affects the cost of capital. The latter term within 
the brackets, െ஑ିஔ஡ା஑
஡த౜
ଵିத౜, describes the saving in corporate tax due to accelerated 
depreciation, and the first term, ஑ିஔ஡ା஑
த೏ି௦த౦
ሺଵିத౜ሻሺଵିதౚሻ ݅, the effect on the size of the 
equity allowance. We observe that with α ൐ δ the two elements are of opposite 
sign; accelerated depreciation decreases the cost of capital via corporate income 
tax, but increases it via personal taxation on dividends. 
 
Even if we observe the effects of accelerated depreciation on the cost of capital, 
with a suitable choice for the normal rate of return, i, we can make the cost of 
capital independent of accelerated depreciation. Choosing the normal rate of 
return as follows: 
 
(20)   i ൌ த౜தౚି௦த౦ ሺ1 െ τୢሻρ, 
 
makes the bracketed term in equation (19) to take the value of zero, and the two 
first terms to melt into ρ. Hence, the marginal condition for investment becomes: 
 
(21)  FᇱሺKሻ ൌ ρ, 
 
which is exactly the same as condition (15) where there was no taxation at all 
(߬ௗ ൌ ߬௣ ൌ ߬௙ ൌ 0), and is independent of the accelerated depreciation. 
 
3.3 Selected special cases 
Now let us concentrate on some interesting special cases of the above general 
model. Table 3 describes these cases. 12 
 
  
                                              
12 Observe that we allow the combination of  ݏ ൌ 0 and ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙ which violates the condition (17). We do 
this to highlight the implications of the tax treatment of normal return on neutrality. 
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Table 3. Optimal imputed rates of return in selected special cases  
Tax Rates  Parameter ݏ  Optimal Normal Rate of Return   
Simple Case: 
߬ௗ ൌ ߬௣ ൌ ߬௙  
ݏ ൌ 0        i ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୮ሻρ
 
 
Case 2A:         
߬ௗ ൌ ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙  
ݏ ൐ 0  i ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻρ   
Case 2B:         
߬ௗ ൌ ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙  
ݏ ൌ 0  i ൌ τ୤τ୮ ሺ1 െ τ୮ሻρ 
 
Case 3A:        
߬ௗ ൐ ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙  
ݏ ൐ 0  i ൌ τ୤τ∗ୢ ሺ1 െ τୢሻρ  τ
∗ୢ ൌ τୢ െ τ୮െτ୤1 െ τ୤ 
Case 3B:        
߬ௗ ൐ ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙  
ݏ ൌ 0  i ൌ τ୤τୢ ሺ1 െ τୢሻρ 
 
 
The first row in Table 3 describes the simple case, which was studied in section 
3.1. In this case neutrality is achieved by choosing the normal rate of return to be 
the after-tax interest rate, i ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୮ሻρ.13 This corresponds to the rule applied in 
the Norwegian shareholder model and analyzed by e.g. Sørensen (2005). As 
explained in Section 2, Norway has maintained equality of the tax rates, while 
Sweden and Finland have diverted from it. 
The second and third rows describe the cases where the corporate tax rate is 
lower than personal-level tax rate on capital income. Case 2A assumes that the 
low tax rate at the firm level is compensated by taxing a share of normal 
dividends distributed to the owner. Now the optimal imputed rate of return is 
i ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻρ. This case closely corresponds to the reform proposal of a tax 
committee in Finland (Ministry of Finance, 2010; Eerola and Kari, 2010). The 
committee proposed to keep the net assets-based split method but to reform the 
prevailing parametrization of the system. It proposed taxing excess dividends as 
capital income at the standard rate (instead of as labor income) and including a 
compensating share of normal dividends in taxable capital income. It also 
proposed defining the imputed rate of return as in case 2A. 
Case 2B shows that neutral treatment of investment and irrelevance of 
depreciation allowances do not require s ൐ 0.	 A suitable choice of i with s ൌ 0 
can yields similar properties. Observe that now the rate required to yield 
neutrality is lower than in case 2A. This result is intuitive: the normal return is 
taxed more leniently but the return is calculated using a lower rate. However, it is 
worth noting that whenever we have τ୮ ൐ τ୤, but s ൌ 0 we cannot have equal 
treatment between a firm’s investment in low-yielding assets (bonds or savings 
                                              
13 The discount factor ρ is typically considered to be aligned with the interest rate r. 
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accounts) and direct investment by owners in such assets. Rather, the relatively 
low rate of corporate tax favors investment canalized through the firm. 
Therefore, compared to case 2A, in case 2B we lose the second neutrality 
property, but achieve neutrality with respect to (high-yielding) business 
investment. 
Cases 3A and 3B in Table 3 consider the case where excess dividends are taxed 
at the rate τୢ ൐ τ୮. Assume first that the rate is proportional. According to the 
results a neutrality-yielding i can be found in both cases s ൐ 0 and s ൌ 0. Again, 
in the latter case a relatively lower rate is required to yield neutrality.14 
 If the tax rate is progressive and CHC owners are spread across the tax brackets 
of the tax schedule, the system cannot be made to satisfy the same neutrality 
properties as the cases above. The cost of capital varies across different owners 
depending on the marginal tax rate on excess dividends. The current Swedish and 
Finnish splitting systems tax excess dividends as labor income at progressive 
rates, and therefore face this challenge.15 
It may be worthwhile to remark that, despite its favorable properties, case 3A 
with a proportional tax rate has not been studied before. It clearly provides an 
interesting policy option particularly if τୢ ൐ τ୮ is required to satisfy the no 
income-shifting condition (1). 
                                              
14 In case 3B we again lose the second neutrality property since ߬௣ ൐ ߬௙ and  ݏ ൌ 0. 
15 A more important source of non-neutrality in these applications might yet be that the countries have not 
targeted the imputed rate of return at the level of the tax-adjusted interest rate. Rather they apply rates 
which are much higher than the regular rates. 
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4. Conclusions 
We have studied the neutrality properties of a dual income tax system, where the 
income received from a CHC is split into capital and labor income parts 
according to net assets of a company. We start from a case where the tax rates on 
capital income and corporate profits are equal, and show that with a suitable 
choice of parameters such a system can be made neutral with respect to 
investment. We also demonstrate that this set of parameters makes the choice of 
the rate of fiscal depreciation irrelevant, a well-known property of a different tax 
system, the ACE tax.  
 
We also investigate whether neutrality can be achieved when tax rates differ. We 
again report neutrality-yielding combinations of parameters for a broad selection 
of combinations of proportional tax rates. The results imply that the key 
parameters provide the tax system designers (surprisingly) powerful tools to 
implement neutrality.  
 
The results also imply that the net assets-based splitting system can have broadly 
as favorable neutrality properties as those DIT systems where the splitting is 
done according to the purchase price of shares. There are some trade-offs, of 
course. While the purchase-price method can be designed to eliminate the 
incentive to defer capital gains realizations (Sørensen, 2005), the existing net 
assets-based models do not carry this property. On the other hand, the irrelevance 
of fiscal depreciations is a property of the net assets-based split but not of the 
alternative model.    
 
These considerations suggest that the net assets-based splitting system should not 
be considered inferior to purchase price-based splitting. The structure of the 
system is not a problem per se, but wrong parameters are. 
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Appendix 
The first term in the objective function in equation 8 can be written as follows:16 
 
(A1)  γD୒ୣ୲ ൌ γൣ൫1 െ τ୮൯D ൅ τ୮iE൧ ൌ 
ൌ γൣ൫1 െ τ୮൯ሾQ െ I െ T୤ ൅ πሺKሻሿ ൅ τ୮iE൧ ൌ 
ൌ Q ൅ γൣ൫1 െ τ୮൯ሾπሺKሻ െ I െ T୤ሿ ൅ τ୮iE൧ ൌ 
ൌ Q ൅ γൣ൫1 െ τ୮൯ൣπሺKሻ െ I െ τ୤ሾπሺKሻ െ αAሿ൧ ൅ τ୮iE൧ ൌ 
ൌ Q ൅ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ െ I ൅ τ୤αA ൅ γτ୮iE ൌ 
ൌ Q ൅ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ െ I ൅ τ୤αA ൅ τ୮1 െ τ୮ iE 
Thus we can write 
 
(A2)  γD୒ୣ୲ െ Q ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ െ I ൅ τ୤αA ൅ த౦ଵିத౦ iE 
 
By substituting I from equation (4) into equation (10) we get 
 
ሺA3ሻ	 γD୒ୣ୲ െ Q ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ െ ሾሺ1 െ τ୤ሻI ൅ τ୤Iሿ ൅ τ୤αA ൅ த౦ଵିத౦ iA ൌ	
ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿ െ τ୤I ൅ τ୤αA ൅ τ୮1 െ τ୮ iA ൌ	
ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿ െ τ୤ሾI െ αAሿ ൅ τ୮1 െ τ୮ iA ൌ	
ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿ െ τ୤Aሶ ൅ τ୮1 െ τ୮ iA ൌ	
ൌ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿ െ τ୤ሾAሶ െ τ୮τ୤൫1 െ τ୮൯ iAሿ	
 
The latter term at the end of equation (12) can then be written as follows:17 
 
  
                                              
16 First use eq. (7), second the budget constraint (eq. (2)), third the identity ൌ ଵଵିఛ೛ , fourth eq. (5), fifth 
rearrange the terms and finally use the identity ߛ ൌ ଵଵିఛ೛ again. 
17 The last equality follows from the fact that the upper bound vanishes when ݐ goes to infinity. 
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(A4) െτ୤ ׬ ሾஶ଴ Aሶ െ
த౦
த౜൫ଵିத౦൯ iAሿe
ି஡୲dt ൌ െτ୤ ׬ ሾஶ଴ Aሶ െ ρAሿeି஡୲dt ൌ 
െτ୤ න ddt ሾA
ஶ
଴
eି஡୲ሿdt ൌ τ୤A଴ 
 
The solution to the original problem, but without any taxes is  πᇱሺKሻ ൌ ρ ൅ δ, 
because 
 
(A5)   max ׬ ሾπሺKሻ െ Iሿeି஡୲dtஶ଴ ൌ 
ൌ max ׬ ൣπሺKሻ െ Kሶ െ δK൧eି஡୲dtஶ଴ ൌ 
ൌmax ׬ ሾπሺKሻ െ δKሿeି஡୲dtஶ଴ െmax ׬ Kሶ eି஡୲dt
ஶ
଴ ൌ 
ൌmax ׬ ሾπሺKሻ െ δKሿeି஡୲dtஶ଴ െ K଴ െmax ׬ ρKeି஡୲dt
ஶ
଴ ൌ 
ൌ max ׬ ሾπሺKሻ െ ሺδ ൅ ρሻKሿeି஡୲dtஶ଴ െ K଴, 
 
which has a solution (just taking a derivative with respect to K) πᇱሺKሻ ൌ ρ ൅ δ.18 
 
Let us next derive equation (18). The Lagrangian for the constrained optimization 
problem reads as follows:19 
 
(A6)     L ൌ ଵିఛ೏ଵିఛ೛ D ൅
ఛ೏ିఛ೛௦
ଵିఛ೛ iA െ Q ൅ qଵሾሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ ൅ τ୤αA ൅ Q െ D െ δKሿ ൅ 
       ൅qଶሾሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπሺKሻ ൅ Q െ D െ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻαAሿ ൅ ߣଵൣD െ u൫1 െ ߬௙൯πሺKሻ൧ ൅ ߣଶQ 
 
Here, as above, D stands for dividends, A is the accounting stock, Q is new equity 
and K is the capital stock.  qଵ, qଶ, ߣଵ and ߣଶ are the Lagrangean multipliers that 
                                              
18 First use eq. (3), second manipulate the terms, third integrate by parts and fourth manipulate the terms 
again. 
19 The maximization problem is the following (D୒ୣ୲ is given in eq. (16): D୒ୣ୲ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻD ൅ ሺ߬ௗ െτ୮sሻiA): 
max ଴ܸ ൌ නሺγD୒ୣ୲ െ Qሻeି஡୲dt
ஶ
଴
ൌ නሺ1 െ ߬ௗ1 െ ߬௣ D ൅
߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏ
1 െ ߬௣ iA
ஶ
଴
ݏ. ݐ. 
(2’)   πሺKሻ ൅ Q ൌ D ൅ I ൅ T୤ 
(3’)                  Kሶ ൌ I െ δK 
(4’)                  Aሶ ൌ I െ αA 
(5’)                  T୤ ൌ τ୤ሾπሺKሻ െ αAሿ 
(Aa)                  ܦ ൒ ݑπሺܭሻሺ1 െ ߬௙ሻ 
(Ab)                  ܳ ൒ 0 
First using (2’) and (5’) for solving I and then plugging this solution to one of (3’) and (4’) each time 
gives the constraints in the Lagrangian (eq. (A6)). 
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can be considered as the shadow prices for K, A and the lower bound restrictions 
for D and Q, respectively. 
 
The solution for the optimization problem reads as follows: 
 
(A7) ப୐பୈ ൌ 	
ଵିఛ೏
ଵିఛ೛ െ qଵെqଶ ൅ ߣଵ ൌ 0	 ⇔ qଵ൅qଶ ൌ
ଵିఛ೏
ଵିఛ೛ ൅ ߣଵ 
 
(A8) ப୐ப୕ ൌ 	െ1 െ qଵെqଶ ൅ ߣଶ ൌ 0	 ⇔ qଵ൅qଶ ൌ 1 െ ߣଶ 
 
(A9) qଵሶ ൌ ρqଵ െ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻFᇱሺKሻሺqଵ൅qଶሻ ൅ δqଵ ൅ ݑሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπᇱሺKሻߣଵ 
 
(A10) qଶሶ ൌ ρqଶ െ ሺఛ೏ିఛ೛௦ଵିఛ೛ ሻi െ τ୤αqଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻαqଶ 
 
Now we consider a steady solution, where the firm does not increase its capital 
stock, but distributes all its profits as dividends. In this case D ൐ u൫1 െ ߬௙൯πሺKሻ 
and therefore ߣଵ ൌ 0. Eq. (A7) then reduces to 
 
(A7’)  qଵ൅qଶ ൌ ଵିఛ೏ଵିఛ೛ 
and eq. (A9) to 
 
(A9’) qଵሶ ൌ ρqଵ െ ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻπ′ሺKሻሺqଵ൅qଶሻ ൅ δqଵ 
 
In a steady state qଵሶ ൌ qଶሶ ൌ 0. Thus, in this case we may solve the shadow price qଶ for the accounting stock, A, from eq. (A9’) straightforwardly (and using 
(A7’)). 
 
(A11)  qଶ ൌ ሺఛ೏ିఛ೛௦ሻ୧ሺ஡ା஑ሻሺଵିఛ೛ሻ ൅
த౜ఈሺଵିఛ೏ሻ
ሺ஡ା஑ሻሺଵିఛ೛ሻ 
 
The terms have intuitive interpretations. The first term describes the present 
value of increasing the normal rate of return in dividend taxation, which takes 
place at the individual level. The second term describes the present value of 
increasing deductibility. 
 
By summing equations (A9’) and (A10) and using the steady-state conditions 
qଵሶ ൌ qଶሶ ൌ 0 we get 
 
⇒ πᇱሺKሻ ൌ δ ൅ ρሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൅
ሺα െ δሻqଶ
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺqଵ ൅ qଶሻ െ
ሺ߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏሻi
ሺ1 െ ߬௣ሻሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺqଵ ൅ qଶሻ
െ τ୤αሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൌ 
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ൌ δ ൅ ρሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ െ
ሺߙ െ ߜሻ൫߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏ൯i
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺߩ ൅ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻ ൅
τ୤ߙሺߙ െ ߜሻ
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺߩ ൅ ߙሻ െ
൫߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏ൯i
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻ
െ τ୤ߙሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൌ 
ൌ δ ൅ ρሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൅
τ୤ߜ
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ െ
τ୤ߙ
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൤1 െ
ߙ െ ߜ
ߩ ൅ ߙ൨
െ ൫߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏ൯iሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻ ൤1 െ
ߙ െ ߜ
ߩ ൅ ߙ൨ ൌ 
ൌ δ ൅ ρሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൅
τ୤
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൤δ െ
ߙሺߩ ൅ ߜሻ
ߩ ൅ ߙ ൨ െ
൫߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏ൯i
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻ ൤1 െ
ߙ െ ߜ
ߩ ൅ ߙ൨ ൌ 
ൌ δ ൅ ρሺ1 െ τ୤ሻ ൤1 െ τ୤
ߙ െ ߜ
ߩ ൅ ߙ൨ െ
൫߬ௗ െ ߬௣ݏ൯i
ሺ1 െ τ୤ሻሺ1 െ ߬ௗሻ ൤1 െ
ߙ െ ߜ
ߩ ൅ ߙ൨ 
 
That is 
 
(A12)  πᇱሺKሻ ൌ δ ൅ ஡ሺଵିத౜ሻ ቂ1 െ τ୤
ఈିఋ
ఘାఈቃ െ
൫ఛ೏ିఛ೛௦൯୧
ሺଵିத౜ሻሺଵିఛ೏ሻ ቂ1 െ
ఈିఋ
ఘାఈቃ 
 
